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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 26/01/2008 Accident number: 512 
Accident time: 07:15 Accident Date: 19/07/2007 
Where it occurred: Task# 
AF/0308/01637/0154, 
Gujor Khel Village, 
Bagram District, 
Parwan Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 26/01/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
use of shovel (?) 
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Accident report 
A letter about this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion 
to a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the 
letter is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. Text 
in [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if the full investigation report is made available in 
future. 
   
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY
OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON [National demining agency] MDU ON JULY 19, 
2007 AT GUJOR KHEL VILLAGE, BAGRAM DISTRICT OF PARWAN 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
An internal investigation team was convened by Area Manager of AMAC Centre (Kabul) to 
investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] a deminer from Good Neighbourhood 
Demining Project of [National demining agency] MCT- 31. The accident occurred at 07:15 
hours on 19 July 2007 at task# AF/0308/01637/0154 located in Gujor khel village, Bagram 
district of Parwan province.  The accident resulted left leg injuries to the deminer. 
 
SUMMARY: 
The mentioned mine contaminated area is one of the security mine belts established by 
Russians around Bagram Airbase which is heavily contaminated by mines. 
On July 19 at 07:15 hours an accident happened to [the Victim] deminer while he was working 
in an area, which was prepared by [National demining agency] MDU-01. The explosion of 
PMN 2 mine resulted superficial injuries to the left leg of the deminer and as he was equipped 
by PPE and visor he did not receive further injuries to his body. After receiving first aids, the 
casualty was evacuated to Bagram airbase Egyptian hospital for treatment.  
 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The following points were found by investigation team: 
[National demining agency] MDU-1 was supporting the team with HITACHI Excavator (ZX-
210). Since the rotary cutter was inactive the area preparation was done by bucket. Bucket 
can plough the area, but it changes the position of mines and makes the mine more sensitive. 
Rotary cutter machine was inactive since 20 June 2007, which has not been repaired so far. 
Team leader of the team claims that while the accident happened the deminer was working 
by bayonet, but the investigation team could not find any sign of explosion on his bayonet or 
trowel, Instead there is much possibility that the deminer was working with portative shovel. 
The deminer had worn the PPE and visor properly as it prevented more injuries to him. 
Original shape of accident point was changed and hand tool of the victim deminer was moved 
from the accident site, however the investigation team had arrived to the site the same day. 
The teams working for Neighbourhood Project do not have mission leave while other 
clearance teams are granted 10 days leave after each 50 working days. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
Good Neighbourhood Project Field Office is to pay attention to repair the Rotary Cutter 
machine as soon as possible. 
Refresher training is to be conducted for the team, focusing on use of hand tools while 
excavation and soil removal. 
The command group of the team have to strictly control the deminers to use the appropriate 
hand tools as required. 
The command group must not touch/disturb the accident point and the equipment involved to 
accident, because it create difficulty for the investigation team to find the facts and cause of 
the accident. 
Project field officer is to consider the team’s mission leaves and provide opportunity for the 
team members to have their mission leave like other demining teams. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 670 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
minor Leg 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because it seems 
that the Victim was using the wrong tool and his error was not corrected. The Field managers 
may also have attempted to conceal the truth from the investigators. 
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the deminer only had a 
bayonet and a folding shovel as excavation tools. These tools are not designed for purpose or 
blast resistant, as recommended in the IMAS. They have both featured in other accidents. 
This record will be revised if the full investigation report is made available in future. 
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